Experimental Economics Lab
NSF Conference on Politics Experiments:
New Perspectives from the Lab, the Field, and the Classroom
Organizers:
- Rick Wilson (Rice)
- Charlie Holt (UVA)
May 19 and 20, 2010
University of Virginia, Department of Economics, Monroe Hall 124
Registration: http://veconlab.econ.virginia.edu/login2.php?table_name=cah1q
Wednesday, May 19
Registration and Light Lunch, noon, Monroe 120 and Courtyard
Welcome, 1:00 -1:15, Monroe 124
Lab Experiments, 1:15 - 2:45pm, Monroe 124
Cheryl Boudreau (UC-Davis) 
The Market for Political Information: How Does Sophistication Affect Citizen Decision Making? (.pdf)
Abstract: Many scholars study the effects of information, but relatively few experiments incorporate the fact that citizens in the real world 1) are exposed to multiple types of information, 2) choose which type(s) of information to receive, and 3) pay opportunity costs when they receive information. I conduct experiments that incorporate these aspects of real world political environments. My results show that subjects are more likely to seek information when they are unsophisticated and when the decisions they must make are difficult. I also find that although subjects’ information searches are far from optimal, unsophisticated subjects’ information searches appear to be more efficient than those of sophisticated subjects. With respect to the effects of information on subjects’ decisions, my results show that different types of information have unique effects on the quality of subjects’ decisions. I also find that unsophisticated subjects typically benefit more from information than do sophisticated subjects.
Rose McDermott (Brown) “The Effect of Political Coalition Categorization on Argument Assessment as Mediated by Voluntary Information Acquisition” (with Max Krasnow, John Tooby, Peter K,Hatemi and Anthony Lopez)
Abstract: Using eye tracking technology, we explore the relationship between what people are actually looking at, and their subsequently reported opinions on related issues and topics within four substantive domains (military, patriotism, sexuality, disgust). In the first demonstration, we show pictures which combine a variety of mixed and ambiguous visual stimuli, accompanied by short narrations which allow us to create an event related signal. We examine what parts of the image subjects look at, and then probe their opinions on relevant political topics, to see if a relationship exists between focus of attention and expressed choice. In the second study, we show images of people with coalition markers and provide accompanying narration that either indicates victimization or not. In both studies, we ascertain prior party identification and ideology. In addition, we administer a number of related personality batteries.
Eric Dickson (Politics, NYU) " Rules of Debate: Theory and Experiment" (.pdf) (with Catherine Hafer and Dimitri Landa)
Abstract: We present a game-theoretic model of debate and a laboratory experiment that explore how strategic incentives to make potentially persuasive arguments vary across different informational and institutional contexts. In our model, a key feature of the informational environment is the extent to which members of a debate audience are able to extract informational content from exposure to an argument that they find unconvincing. Our theoretical results show that when the informational content of unconvincing arguments is relatively high, speakers are discouraged from arguing irrespective of the distinct institutional rules of debate that we consider. By contrast, when the informational content of unconvincing arguments is relatively low, debate rules matter: speakers may be lead towards maximally or minimally informative debate, depending on the debate rule. In a laboratory experiment, we vary the informational and institutional settings for debate across four distinct treatments, and observe patterns of behavior which are broadly consistent with the predictions of our model.
Break, 2:45-3:15pm, Monroe Courtyard
Field Experiments, 3:15 - 4:45, Monroe 124
Kevin Arceneaux (Department of Political Science, Temple University) "Get Out the Vote-by-Mail? A Randomized Field Experiment Testing the Effects of Mobilization in Traditional and Vote-by-Mail Precincts" (with Thad Kousser and Megan Mullin)
Abstract: This study investigates whether those who must vote by mail are more or less responsive to a face to face mobilization message than voters who live in traditional precincts with polling places. Taking advantage of an election setting in which some registrants are assigned to vote by mail, we conducted a randomized field experiment to measure the impact of a door to door GOTV drive. We find that a face to face GOTV contact has a larger effect on the participation of those who vote at polling places than it does on registrants assigned to vote by mail, but only among individuals whose voting behavior is most likely to be shaped by extrinsic social rewards. Whereas election reformers seeking to boost political participation have focused their efforts on making voting more convenient, we conclude that there may be greater payoff for strategies that increase and tap into voting’s extrinsic social rewards.
Sam Whitt (Politics, Mount Mercy College) “ Great Expectations or Wishful Thinking? Ethnicity in a Reverse Dictator Game in Bosnia (.pdf)”
Abstract: This study considers prospects for the revitalization of social norms after ethnic conflict in the case of post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina. Between September 2003 and January 2004, a total of 681 subjects took part in a survey and a series of behavioral decision-making experiments across Bosnia. Using variations on the classic dictator game, the study shows how perceptions of a norm of fairness are impacted by ethnic treatments. Contrary to assumptions of ethnic polarization and hatred, the study reveals the persistence of a norm of fairness across ethnicity in Bosnia and points to the utility of experimental methods in the study of ethnic reconciliation after violence.
Guy Grossman (Political Science, Columbia) “Social Sanctioning and Leadership Selection in the Provision of Public Goods: A Field Experiment in Uganda” (with Delia Baldassarri)
Abstract: Sanctioning is widely considered a viable solution for collective action problems. In this paper we offer a new perspective for studying the conditions under which the threat of punishment is effective in enhancing individual contributions to the provision of public goods. Whereas, thus far, the experimental literature has focused almost exclusively on peer-punishment, our paper begins addressing the role hierarchical centralized authorities play in sustaining cooperation. Specifically, we test whether the process by which leaders acquire their sanctioning powers is consequential for cooperation. We present evidence from a field experiment that involved 1,554 farmers from 50 farmer cooperatives in Uganda
Plenary Speaker: 5:00 - 5:45pm, Monroe 130
Arthur Lupia (Political Science, Michigan) " Are Experiments Necessary? Progress and Interdisciplinary in Political Science"
BBQ Dinner: 6:00 - 7:30pm, Colonnade Hotel, Pavilion VII, Garden Solarium;
Followed by social networking on the Downtown Pedestrian Mall. Look for people at Enoteca.
Thursday, May 20
Breakfast: 8:00 - 9:00am, Monroe 120 and Courtyard
Plenary Speaker: 9:00 - 9:45am, Monroe 130
Alan Gerber (Political Science, Yale) Field Experiments in Politics
Break, 9:45 - 10:15am, Courtyard
Classroom Experiments, 10:15 am - 12:00pm, VEconlab Monroe, B16
Rick Wilson (Rice) and Catherine Eckel (Dallas); "Classroom Experiments on Political Economy"
Charles Holt (UVA) " Online VEconlab Experiments for Politics Classes, with an example on Elinor Ostrom's Work: Tragedy of the Common Canal"
Lunch Buffet and Speakers: Funding and Publishing
Buffet at 12:00pm, Monroe 130
Speakers at 12:30pm, Monroe 124
Brian Humes (NSF)
Carol Mershon (NSF)
Rick Wilson (AJPS)
Laura Razzolini (SEJ/VCU and formerly NSF)
Graduate Research, 1:15 - 3:00pm, Monroe 124,
Brad Leveck, UCSD Chair
Dustin Tingley (Princeton/Harvard, Politics) "Identifcation of Causal Mechanisms from Experimental and Observational Data” (.pdf) (with K. Imai, L. Keele, and T. Yamamoto)
Abstract:Understanding causal mechanisms is the fundamental goal of social science research. Demonstrating whether one variable causes a change in another is often insuffcient, and researchers seek to explain why such a causal relationship arises. Nevertheless, very little is understood about how to identify causal mechanisms in empirical research. Many researchers either informally talk about possible causal mechanisms or attempt to quantify them without explicitly stating the required assumptions. Often, some researchers assert that process tracing in detailed case studies is the only way to evaluate causal mechanisms. Others contend the search for causal mechanisms is so elusive that we should instead focus on the identification of causal effects alone. In this paper, we show how to identify causal mechanisms from experimental and observational data. Using the potential outcomes framework of causal inference, we formally define causal mechanisms, present general identification and estimation strategies, and provide means to assess the sensitivity of one's conclusions to the potential violations of the key identification assumption. Finally, we propose several alternative research design strategies for both experimental and observational studies that may help identify causal mechanisms with more credible assumptions. We illustrate the proposed methodology using media framing experiments and observational studies of incumbency advantage.
Daniel Myers (Princeton, Politics) “ Information Sharing in Small Group Deliberation (.pdf)”
Abstract: Deliberation is intended to lead to better, more legitimate public policy by increasing public knowledge. Theorists pin these claims on the way deliberation promotes information sharing, exposing citizens to new facts and perspectives. But will people share information in deliberation? In this paper I combine game-theoretic and psychological theories about information sharing to create a full theoretical account of when information will and will not be shared in deliberation. I test these theories using an experimental design that combines the methodologies of social psychology and experimental economics. The results show that information sharing in deliberation is rarely perfect, and is biased in predictable ways that should be taken into account when designing deliberative institutions.
Aniol Llorente-Saguer (Caltech, Humanities and Social Sciences) "Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes" (with Alessandra Casella and Thomas R. Palfrey)
Abstract: In this paper we propose a competitive equilibrium theory of markets for votes in which voters have incomplete information about other members' preferences. There is a single binary decision to be made by a committee. Before voting, a competitive market for votes operates, in which voters may buy and sell their votes with each other. After the market and the transfer of votes, the committee decision is taking by majority rule. We define a notion of competitive equilibrium that we call an ex ante vote trading equilibrium and prove existence. We next face the question of whether markets are desirable or not by studying the welfare properties of the equilibrium. To test our theoretical predictions, we present some experimental evidence based on an implementation of the market with a continuous double auction. Over time, prices converge toward the equilibrium prices from above, and allocations are close to the equilibrium allocations.
Sheheryar Banori, (UT Dallas, Politics) “Does Nepotism Pay?"
Abstract: We introduce a test of nepotism using naturally-occurring groups. We ask whether individuals are willing to choose a less productive partner in Berg et al's (1995) trust game due to nepotism. In addition, we ask what predicts this behavior, and what impact this selection has on trust, reciprocity and efficiency. Group identity is engaged by utilizing the residential college system at a major US University. First movers indicate a preference for participating in games with a partner from their own college, or from the general pool of University students. In a parallel setting, first movers are told that there is a 50% chance of being matched with a second mover from either pool. Results indicate that individuals are likely to engage in costly nepotism, driven by higher expectations of trustworthiness, group identity, and risk preferences. We show that beliefs of trustworthiness are accurate, but engaging in nepotism is still inefficient overall. However, we find that first movers earn more by engaging in costly nepotism. In addition, the ability to engage in nepotism raises both trust and trustworthiness for the primary group members.
